

When are Analyst Recommendation Changes Influential?

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Influential recommendation changes

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Our paper

- We identify recommendation changes (*Recchgs*) that impact the firm's stock in a visible way.
- We investigate when *Recchgs* have such noticeable impact and who makes such calls.

Literature examines only the average reaction

- Papers such as Stickel (1995), Fang and Yasuda (2007), Altinkilic and Hansen (2009), Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004).
 - But if the average reaction to a downgrade is about -1% , -1% may be statistically significant but it is hardly noticeable by any investor.
 - Averages also do not answer our question on which *Recchgs* are influential.

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
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 - But if the average reaction to a downgrade is about -1% , -1% may be statistically significant but it is hardly noticeable by any investor.
 - Averages also do not answer our question on which *Recchgs* are influential.

Other problems with averages

- Lots of *Recchgs* have returns close to zero or in the wrong direction. See Fig 2a.
- Many *Recchgs* are issued together with firm news releases.
- Averages are dominated by large stocks.

Fig2a: Histogram of 1-point downgrades

Many obs in the shaded zero bin & many have wrong-sign returns



Influential: We must notice the impact!

Influential Definition

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
- We also use an abnormal turnover definition (a *Recchg* that causes abnormal high trading volume is also important)
- Our analyses use a sample that removes *Recchgs* issued together with major firm news so that we can attribute the stock price reaction to the *Recchg* itself.

Data

- IBES US Detail recommendations, 1994-2006. Five-point rating scheme from 1[Strong Sell] to 5[Strong Buy] so that *Recchg* ranges from -4 to $+4$.

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- IBES US Detail recommendations, 1994-2006. Five-point rating scheme from 1[Strong Sell] to 5[Strong Buy] so that *Recchg* ranges from -4 to $+4$.
- Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of 154,134 *Recchgs*. Bulk falls within -2 to $+2$.



Influential definition

- ① **Influential in abnormal returns** if CAR_i has the same sign as $Recchg$ and $|CAR_i| > 1.96 \times \sqrt{2} \times \sigma_\epsilon$
- 2-day $CAR_i = \prod_{t=0}^1 (1 + R_{it}) - \prod_{t=0}^1 (1 + R_{it}^{DGTW})$
 - σ_ϵ is the stdev of residuals from a time-series regression of past 3-month (days -69 to -6) firm returns R_{it} against market returns R_{mt} and the Fama-French factors SMB and HML .

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
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- Influential in abnormal turnover** if $abtturn$ is $> 1.96 \times \sqrt{2} \times \sigma_{abtturn}$

 - where $abtturn = \ln turnover - \overline{\ln turnover}$
 - $\overline{\ln turnover}$ is the past 3-month average daily $\ln turnover$
 - $\ln turnover = \ln(turnover + 0.00000255)$.

If we sequentially remove firm-news contaminated days...

...Avg $|CAR_i|$ drops. (Note: $\approx \frac{1}{3}$ of *Recchgs* are contaminated!)



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Bottomline...

- Few *Recchgs* are influential. The typical reaction cannot be noticed by investors.
- But there are more influential *Recchgs* than expected based on chance alone. Analysts add value by virtue of the fact that there are influential *Recchgs*.

Effect of influential *Recchgs*

- Higher Leader-Follower Ratios (Cooper, Day, & Lewis, 2001): Other analysts hurry to revise after them.
- Increases in return volatility, turnover, analyst activity, magnitude of earnings forecast revisions. Consistent with a paradigm shift occurring (Hong, Stein, & Yu, 2007). Investors view the firm differently after an influential *Recchg*.
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Characteristics	Influential based on firm's abnormal returns			
	Not Influ	Influential	Difference	
			Influ - Not	t-stat
Table 3, Panel C: Change in firm environment around recommendation				
Leader-Follower Ratio of rec	2.032	3.176	1.144***	(12.21)
Δ Volatility of daily ret $\times 100$	-0.081	0.350	0.431***	(21.41)
Δ Daily turnover $\times 100$	0.004	0.096	0.092***	(18.95)
Δ in # of EPS forecasts	-0.359	4.978	5.337***	(9.65)
Δ in FY2 Forecast Revision $\times 100$	0.034	0.127	0.093***	(3.93)
Fraction with large industry vw return	0.042	0.123	0.080***	(18.45)

Analyst and Firm characteristics: Table 3

Characteristics	Influential based on firm's abnormal returns			
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Panel A: Analyst and recommendation characteristics				
Forecast accuracy quintile	2.810	2.771	-0.039***	(-2.75)
Away from consensus	0.358	0.416	0.058***	(9.84)
Star analyst	0.159	0.205	0.046***	(9.53)
Absolute analyst experience (# Qtrs)	28.451	29.644	1.192***	(4.63)
Relative analyst experience	2.652	3.354	0.702***	(5.03)
Concurrent earnings forecast	0.446	0.510	0.064***	(10.15)
Influential before (any stock)	0.562	0.664	0.102***	(15.57)
Influential before (same stock)	0.100	0.137	0.037***	(9.99)
Panel B: Firm characteristics prior to recommendation				
B/M ratio	0.484	0.498	0.014***	(2.78)
Size (\$m)	8971.683	7451.049	-1520.6***	(-5.49)
Institutional ownership	0.608	0.634	0.027***	(8.44)
Dispersion x100	14.167	15.119	0.952	(1.31)
Total volatility x100	2.876	2.556	-0.319***	(-11.79)
Daily turnover x100	0.655	0.603	-0.052***	(-7.42)
# of EPS forecasts	86.669	72.422	-14.247***	(-15.56)

Table 4: Predicting Influential *Recchgs*

22 variables in the probit model to gauge the marginal effect (impact of one stdev change of each variable on the baseline influential probability *ceteris paribas*).

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Explanatory Variable	Influential in returns	
	Coefficient	Marg. Eff
Influential before (any stock)	0.154*** (8.35)	2.88%
Influential before (same stock)	0.065*** (2.93)	1.21%
Rec level	0.045*** (4.01)	0.80%
Absolute value of <i>recchg</i>	-0.017 (-1.00)	-0.16%
Upgrade Dummy	0.080*** (4.01)	1.50%
Reg FD Dummy	0.206*** (8.82)	3.85%
Settlement Dummy	0.093*** (3.84)	1.73%

Table 4 (part 1 of 3)

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Table 4 (part 1 of 3)

- Being influential in the past begets more success.
- Upgrades are more influential.
- Regulatory reforms improves influential probability.

Predicting Influential *Recchgs*, analyst variables

Explanatory Variable	Influential in returns	
	Coefficient	Marg. Eff
Past Forecast accuracy quintile	-0.011* (-1.90)	-0.24%
Away from consensus	0.147*** (9.87)	2.74%
Star analyst	0.207*** (9.36)	3.87%
Absolute analyst experience	-0.001* (-1.96)	-0.41%
Relative Analyst experience	0.001 (0.84)	0.14%
Concurrent earnings forecast	0.119*** (7.87)	2.22%
Past Leader-Follower Ratio (LFR)	0.006*** (2.74)	0.36%

Table 4 (part 2 of 3)

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Table 4 (part 2 of 3)

Biggest marginal effects are from:

- *Recchg* away from the consensus.
- Star analyst status (from Institutional Investor poll).
- Concurrently issued earnings forecasts.

Predicting Influential *Recchgs*, firm variables

Explanatory Variable	Influential in returns	
	Coefficient	Marg. Eff
Log(B/M)	-0.100*** (-9.66)	-1.51%
Log(Size)	-0.082*** (-10.67)	-2.49%
Price momentum	0.031** (2.38)	0.34%
Log(Institutional ownership)	0.049** (2.15)	0.38%
Log(Turnover)	0.042*** (2.82)	0.62%
Log(Idiosyncratic volatility)	-0.351*** (-15.10)	-3.45%
Dispersion	0.032*** (3.13)	0.38%
Log(Analyst activity)	-0.138*** (-11.49)	-2.17%

Table 4 (part 3 of 3)

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- Low B/M (growth) firms and small firms are more likely to have influential *Recchgs*
- Low idio. volatility firms
- Low analyst-activity firms


Table 5: Ever Influential vs. Never Influential

- 25% (1 in 4 analysts) have never issued any influential *Recchg.*
- For ever influential analysts, 22% (1 in 5) of their *Recchgs* are influential

Characteristics	Influential based on firm's abnormal returns			
	Never	Ever Influential	Difference Ever-Never	t-stat
Number of Analysts	935	2,821 75.1%		
% influential recs for typical analyst	0.0%	22.1%		
Forecast accuracy quintile	2.894	2.819	-0.076***	(-3.20)
Away from consensus	0.357	0.367	0.010	(1.52)
Was once a Star analyst	0.092	0.253	0.161***	(12.91)
Absolute analyst experience (# Qtrs)	18.09	24.42	6.329***	(10.11)
Relative analyst experience	-1.26	1.36	2.624***	(9.61)
Concurrent earnings forecast	0.477	0.462	-0.015*	(-1.66)

Fig 3a: Histogram of an individual's influential fraction

- Ability to be influential is a skill and not random.



Earnings forecast revisions

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- With a sample that removes corporate news-contaminated revisions, we find only 5% of earnings forecast revisions are influential. But **influential fraction doubles** when revision is accompanied by a recommendation.
- Hence, impactful research is more likely to be conveyed with a *Recchg*.

Tabel 7, Panel A: Forecast revisions sample

Forecast Revision Sample	Influential based on abnormal:	All forecast revisions			Revisions with Recs		
		Not Influ	Influential	Percent	Not Influ	Influential	Percent
Annual	Returns	286,813	13,402	4.5%	18,094	2,023	10.1%
	Turnover	283,672	16,543	5.5%	17,676	2,441	12.1%
Quarterly	Returns	105,570	5,346	4.8%	6,268	799	11.3%
	Turnover	104,125	6,791	6.1%	6,081	986	14.0%
LTG forecasts	Returns	42,258	1,750	4.0%	3,119	310	9.0%
	Turnover	41,055	2,953	6.7%	2,930	499	14.6%

Alternative influential definitions

- 1 *Recchgs* could be stale if the prior rating is too old. We get the same results if we define *Recchg* as the current rating minus the prevailing consensus, or the current rating minus the last rating by any analyst.
- 2 If a *Recchg* causes the entire market to move, we may understate the influential fraction. But, we get similar results with a raw return-based influential definition.
- 3 We remove *Recchgs* when the $[-2,-1]$ return is large, as an extra proxy for significant firm news. We get a similar influential fraction of *Recchgs*.
- 4 We remove recommendation days from the computation of idiosyncratic volatility. Influential fraction goes up slightly to 12.1%.

Conclusion

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- We suggest an alternative approach to judge the impact of a recommendation change.
 - We see the value of analysts—*Recchgs* have influential impact 12% of the time.
 - But the bulk of recommendations have little visible impact.
- Analysts are serially influential. Some analysts (stars, bold, etc.) are more likely to be influential, and some types of firms (growth, small, low activity, etc).
- Recommendation changes, not earnings forecast revisions, are the usual avenue that leads to significant moves in stock prices.