John Nicholas Williams
Associate Professor of Philosophy
School of Social Sciences
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road, Level 4
Singapore 178903

M.Sc. in Knowledge-Based Systems, Sussex, 1990;
Ph.D. in Philosophy, Hull, 1981;
M.A. in Philosophy, Exeter, 1976;
B.A. Single Honours in Philosophy, Swansea, 1974



My Biking Experience


Research Interests: Paradoxes, Theory of Knowledge, Philosophy of Language, Applied Ethics and Philosophy of Religion.

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44. John N. Williams, ‘Still a New Problem for Defeasibility: A Rejoinder to Borges’, forthcoming in Logos and Episteme, March 2016.


43. John N. Williams and Neil Sinhababu. 2015.The Backward Clock, Truth-Tracking, and Safety’. Journal of Philosophy 112(1). 46-55.


42. John N. Williams. 2015. ‘Not Knowing You Know: A New Objection to the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge’. Analysis 75(2). 213-217.


41.John N. Williams and Eric W. K. Tsang. 2015 Classifying Generalization: Paradigm War or Abuse of Terminology?’ Journal of Information Technology 30(1). 18-29.


40. John N. Williams. 2015. ‘Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey’. Philosophy Compass 10(1). 10-23. Commissioned.


39. John N. Williams. 2015. ‘Moore’s Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey’. Philosophy Compass 10(1). 24-37. Commissioned.


38. John N. Williams. 2015. ‘Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore’s Paradox'. Theoria 81(1). 27-47.


36. John N. Williams. 2014. ‘True Succession and Inheritance of Traditions: Looking Back on the Debate’. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3(9). 15-29. Commissioned.


35. John N. Williams. 2014. ‘Moore’s Paradox in Belief and Desire’. Acta Analytica 29(1). 1-29.


34. John N. Williams. 2013. ‘Moore’s Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis’. Philosophical Studies 165(3). 1117-1138.


33. John N. Williams. 2013. ‘Further Reflection on True Successors and Traditions’. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2(9). 12-16.


32. John N. Williams. 2013. ‘The Completeness of the Pragmatic Solution to Moore's Paradox in Belief: A Reply to Chan’. Synthese 190(12). 2457–2476.


31. John N. Williams. 2013. “David-Hillel Ruben’s ‘Traditions and True Successors’: A Critical Reply”. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2(7). 40-45. Commissioned.


30. Eric W. K. Tsang and John N. Williams. 2012. ‘Generalization and Induction: Misconceptions, Clarifications and a Classification of Induction’. Management Information Systems Quarterly 36(3), 729-748.


29. John N. Williams 2012. 'Moore-paradoxical assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief'. Acta Analytica 27(1). 9-12.


28. John N. Williams. 2012. ‘Beyond Minority Report: Pre-Crime, Pre-punishment and Pre-desert’. Proceedings of ‘Knowledge, Creativity and Transformations of Societies’. 10-15.


27. John N. Williams. 2011. ‘Moore-paradoxical Belief, Conscious Belief and the Epistemic Ramsey Test’. In Topics in Contemporary Epistemology, a special issue of Synthese 188(2). 231-246.


26. T. Brian Mooney, Mark Nowacki and John N. Williams. 2011. ‘Kovesi and the Formal and Material Elements of Concepts’, Philosophia 39(4). 699–720.


25. John N. Williams. 2011. ‘The Ethics of Placebo-Controlled Trials in Developing Countries to Prevent Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV’, reprinted by invitation in Spanda Journal 2(1). Special Issue on the Placebo Effect.


24. Mitchell S. Green and John N. Williams 2011. ‘Moore’s Paradox, Truth and Accuracy’. Acta Analytica 26(3). 243-255.


23. John N. Williams 2010. ‘Moore’s Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief’. Theoria 76 (3), 211-248.


22. John N. Williams. 2009. ‘Justifying circumstances and Moore-paradoxical beliefs: a response to Brueckner’. Analysis 69(3). 490-496.


21. John N. Williams. 2008. ‘Propositional Knowledge and Know-How’. Synthese 165(1). 107-125.


20. John N. Williams 2007. ‘The Surprise Exam Paradox: Disentangling Two Reductios’. Journal of Philosophical Research 32. 67-95.


19. John N. Williams. 2007. ‘Moorean Absurdity and Iterated Belief’. Journal of Philosophical Research 32. 145-169.


18. John N. Williams. 2006. ‘Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity and its Disappearance from Speech’. Synthese 149(1). 225 -254.


17. John N. Williams. 2006. ‘In Defence of an Argument for Evans’s Principle: A Rejoinder to Vahid’. Analysis 66(1). 167-170.


16. John N. Williams. 2006. ‘Moore’s Paradoxes and Conscious Belief’. Philosophical Studies 127(3). 383-414.


15. Wee Liang Tan, John N. Williams and Teck Meng Tan. 2005.Defining the ‘Social’ in Social Entrepreneurship: Altruism and Entrepreneurship”. International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 1. 353-365.


14. John N. Williams. 2004. ‘Moore’s Paradoxes, Evans’s Principle and Self-knowledge’. Analysis 64(4). 348-353.


13. John N. Williams. 2000. ‘The Ethics of Placebo-Controlled Drug Trials in Developing Countries to Prevent Mother-to Child Transmission of HIV’. Annals, Academy of Medicine, Singapore 29(5). 557-562 (Keynote Paper).


12. John N. Williams. 1998. ‘Wittgensteinian Accounts of Moorean Absurdity’. Philosophical Studies 92(3). 283-306.


11. John N. Williams. 1996. ‘Moorean Absurdities and the Nature of Assertion’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(1). 135-49.


10. John N. Williams 1994. ‘Moorean Absurdity and the Intentional “Structure” of Assertion’. Analysis 54(3). 60-66.


9. John N. Williams. 1992. ‘Ontological Disproof of God's Existence’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70(2). 204-210.


8. John N. Williams. 1992. ‘Belief-in and Belief in God’. Religious Studies 28(3). 401-406.


7. John N. Williams. 1988. ‘Confucius, Mencius and the Notion of True Succession’. Philosophy East and West 38(2). 157-171.


6. John N. Williams. 1987. ‘The Preface Paradox Dissolved’. Theoria 53(2-3). 121-140.


5. John N. Williams. 1982. ‘The Absurdities of Moore's Paradoxes’. Theoria 48(1). 38-46.


4. John N. Williams. 1982. ‘Believing the Self-Contradictory’. American Philosophical Quarterly 19(3). 279-285.


3. John N. Williams. 1981. ‘Inconsistency and Contradiction’. Mind 90(360). 600-602.


2. John N. Williams. 1981. ‘Justified Belief and the Infinite Regress Argument’.  American Philosophical Quarterly 18(1). 85-88.


1. John N. Williams. 1979. ‘Moore's Paradox - One or Two?’. Analysis 39(3). 141-142.


Book Reviews


3. 2006. Review of Punishment:  The Supposed Justifications Revisited by Ted Honderich, Metapyschology 10.47.


2. 1997. Review of Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction to Epistemology by Stephen Cade Hetherington, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75, 562.


1. 1996. Review of An Introduction to Historical Epistemology by Mary and Jim Tiles, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 312-14.


Entry in Book


1. 2010. ‘Doxastic Logic’ in Key Terms in Logic (2010) edited by Jon Williamson and Federica Russo, Continuum Books, London.


Co-edited Volume


1. 2007. Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person edited by Mitchell S. Green and John N. Williams, including articles by Jonathan Adler and Bradley Armour-Garb, Jay Atlas, Tom Baldwin, Claudio de Almeida, Andre Gallois, Robert Gordon, Mitchell Green, Alan Hájek, Roy Sorensen, and John N. Williams, with a 35-page Introduction by John. N. Williams and Mitchell S. Green. Oxford University Press 2007.


Co-authored Textbooks


5. T. Brian Mooney, John N. Williams and Steven Burik, An Introduction to Critical and Creative Thinking: Analyzing and Evaluating Ordinary Language Reasoning. McGraw-Hill, forthcoming 23 December 2015.


4. 2011. Ilya Farber, Brian Mooney, Mark Nowacki, Tan Yoo Guan and John N. Williams, Thinking Things Through: An Introduction to Analytical Skills Second Edition. McGraw-Hill. 


3. 2009. Ilya Farber, Brian Mooney, Mark Nowacki, Tan Yoo Guan and John N. Williams, Thinking Things Through: An Introduction to Analytical Skills, 2009 McGraw-Hill. 


2. 2005. John N. Williams, Tan Yoo Guan, Mark Nowacki and Wong Yew Leong, Analytical Skills: Constructing and Evaluating Arguments: Revised Edition. McGraw-Hill.


1. 2004. John N. Williams, Tan Yoo Guan, Mark Nowacki and Wong Yew Leong, Analytical Skills: Constructing and Evaluating Arguments 2004 McGraw-Hill.


Published Case Study


1. Tan Wee-Liang, Tan Teck-Meng and John Williams. 2005. ‘Enterprises created for self-interest and common good’ in Kao, W.Y, Kao, R. and Yang, J. An Entrepreneurial Approach To Corporate Management, Second Edition, Prentice-Hall, 2005, 251-254.


Chapters in Books


4. John N. Williams and T. Brian Mooney. ‘The Confucian Filial Duty to Care (xiao ) for Elderly Parents’ forthcoming in Culture and Christianity in Dialogue.  Edited by Janis Ozolins, Springer.


3. T. Brian Mooney, Mark Nowacki and John N. Williams, ‘Kovesi, Connaturality, and the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Virtues’ in Morality and Meaning: The Legacy of Julius Kovesi, (eds.) T. Brian Mooney and Alan Tapper, Studies in Moral Philosophy, Brill Academic Publishers, 2012.


2. John N. Williams and Mitchell. S. Green. ‘Introduction’ in Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person’ edited by Mitchell. S. Green and John N. Williams, Oxford University Press, 2007.


1. John N. Williams. ‘Moore’s paradoxes, Evans’s Principle and Iterated Belief’ in Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality and the First Person edited by Mitchell S. Green and John. N. Williams, Oxford University Press 2007.


Government Publications (Books)


1. C.S.Choong and John N. Williams, Revenue Accounting and the 5R Revenue Theory for Management Reporting: An Objective and Logical Approach to Revenue and Receivable Recognition in Recording and Reporting, SNP Publishers, ISBN 981-04-2291, 1-195, in the Supreme Court Law Library No. KZ657CHO.


Single-Authored Book in Progress


A Unified Treatment of Moore’s Paradox: Belief, Knowledge, Assertion and Rationality. Under contract with Oxford University Press.


Oh God, It’s Monday: A Humorous Approach to Philosophical ParadoxesSilverKris (November 2000) 64-65.


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